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Lassiter v. Department of Social Services:
What It Means for the Indigent Divorce Litigant
I. INTRODUCTION
The validity of a divorce' decree or a judgment denying divorce can be
challenged on the grounds that a matrimonial litigant has a constitutional right
to counsel. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services2 the United States
Supreme Court outlined a limited right to appointed counsel in civil cases
affecting fundamental individual interests. In Lassiter an indigent mother
faced the State's attempt to terminate her parental rights. The Court noted
that in some parental termination cases, although not in petitioner's, failure
by a state to provide counsel constitutes a violation of the due process clause
of the United States Constitution.'
The Lassiter Court laid out the test that determines the necessity of
counsel in those cases that do not concern a possible loss of physical liberty.
The test balances three elements against each other: the private interest at
stake in the proceeding, the relevant state interests, and the risk that lack of
counsel would result in erroneous determinations.4 The net weight of these
elements is measured against a presumption that counsel is constitutionally
required only when the indigent litigant's physical liberty is jeopardized. The
Court held that the facts of Lassiter did not overcome the presumption against
counsel, but indicated that other parental termination cases might necessitate
provision of counsel.
6
A divorce decree, like a termination of parental rights, affects a funda-
mental individual interest. 7 When a fundamental interest is at stake, courts
afford it more protection than other interests that arise in some other civil
cases, such as economic interests! Because of the importance of an individ-
ual's interest in his or her marriage, an indigent divorce litigant may have a
constitutional right to counsel under the Lassiter analysis. This Case
Comment first will consider Lassiter in greater detail. It then will investigate
both the presumption against counsel and the elements of the Lassiter test as
applied to divorce. Finally, this Case Comment will focus on arguments useful
in determining which divorce cases constitutionally require counsel to be
provided to indigent litigants under the Lassiter test.
1. "Divorce" will be used in this Case Comment to refer to all methods of terminating a marriage,
including annulment and dissolution. Either the granting or denial of a divorce can be unjust if both parties are
not represented by counsel. See infra text accompanying notes 95-103.
2. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
3. Id. at 31-32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law ......
4. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
5. Id. at 26-27.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 67-94.
8. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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II. LASSITER V. DEPARTMENT OF SocIAL SERVICES
On August 31, 1978, Abby Gail Lassiter was stripped of her status as
parent of her natural son, William L. Lassiter. Although Ms. Lassiter was
imprisoned on a murder conviction at the time of the hearing, she appeared
pro se in her defense. The trial court terminated her parental rights after
finding that she willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for her
son and that termination would be in the best interests of the minor.9
Ms. Lassiter appealed this ruling to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.' 0 She argued that North Carolina's failure to appoint
counsel for her violated the constitutional standards of due process of law."
The Supreme Court used a balancing test to decide that Ms. Lassiter's case
was not constitutionally defective. 2 The net weight of the three interests
considered-Ms. Lassiter's interest in the termination proceeding, the risk of
erroneous determination, and North Carolina's interest in the case-did not
outweigh the presumption against counsel. The Court stated, however, that if
Lassiter had been an appropriate case, "[I]t could not be said that the
* . .[elements in the balance of interests] did not overcome the presumption
against the right to appointed counsel .... ' Future trial courts have to
determine when counsel is required by applying the Lassiter test on a case-by-
case basis. "
The tripartite balancing test used by the Lassiter Court originated in
Mathews v. Eldridge. '5 In Eldridge the Social Security Administration ter-
minated plaintiff's disability benefits after an investigation had led the
Administration to conclude that plaintiff no longer was disabled. Plaintiff
claimed that due process entitled him to an evidentiary hearing on the
matter. ' 6 The Court applied a balancing test and found that this protection
was not constitutionally required. '7 The Court noted that the balancing test
identifies the "specific dictates of due process" ', and, therefore, is applicable
to requests for other procedural safeguards. '9 Even though a majority of the
Court in Lassiter extended the Eldridge balancing test to requests for
appointed counsel in termination proceedings, by adding the presumption
against counsel it made a favorable outcome for the indigent parent less
likely.2
9. 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
10. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
11. 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
12. Id. at 33. Lassiter was a 5-4 decision. Justice Stewart authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger (who also filed a brief concurrence) and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Powell. Justice Blackmun
dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, while Justice Stevens dissented separately.
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 31-32.
15. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16. Id. at 325.
17. Id. at 349.
18. Id. at 335.
19. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). In Little, decided the same day as Lassiter, the Court used the
Eldridge test to hold that an indigent paternity suit defendant must be provided free blood typing.
20. See infra text accompanying note 47.
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Before Lassiter the Court had not explicitly applied the presumption
against counsel. The majority opinion in Lassiter surveyed primarily criminal
prosecution cases in the counsel area. 2' The Court concluded that a "pre-
eminent generalization" could be made about these decisions: the right to
counsel had been recognized only if the proceeding in question had placed the
individual's physical liberty in danger. 22 The Court did not declare this
"generalization" a rule of law, but concluded that the precedents gave rise to
a presumption that to comply with due process a state need not provide
counsel except in situations threatening physical liberty.23 The Court never
before had stated that the "generalization" ripened into a presumption, a
presumption that played a key role in the holding of Lassiter.
The Supreme Court applied the Eldridge test to the facts of Lassiter to
decide whether an absolute right to counsel arises from the nature of parental
termination hearings. 24 First, the majority recognized the importance of a
parent's interest in his or her child?25 The Court then declared that because
North Carolina sought to deprive petitioner of this interest, she had a
"commanding" interest in assuring an accurate outcome in the termination
proceeding.26 The Court noted further that because of the state's concern for
the welfare of the child it shares the parent's interest in ajust determination.27
The Lassiter Court also examined the primary interest advanced by
North Carolina to justify the withholding of counsel-increased cost to the
state. The majority characterized the state's fiscal interest as "relatively
weak" in parental termination hearings. Justice Stewart argued that it was
"hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as
those here .... The Court also identified another state interest promoted
by the withholding of counsel-encouragement of informal proceedings. 29
Finally, the Court applied the third element in the Eldridge balancing test,
the risk that absent counsel the proceeding at issue might result in an erroneous
outcome, to the facts of Lassiter. The Court examined North Carolina's
termination procedure to determine whether it adequately protected each
party's interest in an accurate determination. a The majority observed that the
procedures and issues inherent in the termination hearing were often com-
monplace. 3' Nonetheless, the Court noted that the typical defendant, one
with little education, might fail to understand the ultimate issues in the
21. 452 U.S. 18,25-26 (1981). The Court principally examined Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
22. 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
23. Id. at 26-27.
24. Id. at 27-3 1.
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id.
?7. Id.
28. Id. at 28. The presumption against counsel, however, had the effect of giving greater weight to the state
interests served by the withholding of counsel.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 28-29.
31. Id. at 30.
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hearing; the uncounseled parent also might be overwhelmed by the combina-
tion of the formal courtroom environment and the usage of unfamiliar legal
procedures.32
After applying each of the Eldridge elements to the facts in Lassiter, the
Court weighed its net findings against the presumption against counsel. The
Court stated that the presumption would be overcome and a lack of due process
found in cases in which "the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their
peak." 33 Not all termination hearings, however, display a similar distribution
of the Eldridge elements. Thus, the Court held that the presence of the right to
counsel is to be determined by application of the Lassiter test on a case-by-
case basis at the trial level.3 a
After the majority's rejection of an absolute right to counsel in parental
termination hearings, it proceeded to the second step in its analysis. Utilizing
the case-by-case approach, the Court questioned whether Abby Gail
Lassiter's case was one in which the Eldridge elements outweighed the pre-
sumption against counsel. The Court observed that Ms. Lassiter's interest in
the proceeding was weakened because the petition to terminate her parental
rights contained no allegations that later could result in criminal liability.
5
The Court then considered the risk that Ms. Lassiter would be erroneous-
ly deprived of her son because she had not been represented by counsel. The
majority enumerated a number of circumstances supporting its conclusion
that the result of the hearing had been proper despite the absence of counsel.
The hearing presented no difficult points of procedural or substantive law,
and no expert witnesses testified. Although Ms. Lassiter asserted in her
argument that her mother could assume custody of her son, other evidence
indicated that the mother would be unable to do so. 36 Furthermore, Ms.
Lassiter was a convicted murderer who showed little concern for either her
child or the hearing. The Court concluded that "the weight of the evidence
that she had few sparks of such interest was sufficiently great that the
presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative
difference." 3 7 Thus, Ms. Lassiter's claim to a right to appointed counsel
failed to withstand scrutiny under the second step of the Lassiter analysis
because the likelihood that the trial court's ruling was erroneous was out-
weighed by these other interests.
In his dissent Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, employed the Eldridge test without using the majority's presump-
tion and reached an opposite result. 38 Justice Blackmun did not agree with the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 31, 32; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
35. 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 32-33.
38. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority's "generalization" that previous decisions supported a presumption
against counsel absent a threat to physical liberty.39 Justice Stevens, in a
separate dissent, deemed a balancing approach inapplicable to cases concern-
ing a fundamental individual interest. 40 He argued that fairness requires pro-
vision of counsel whenever deprivation of a fundamental right is threatened. 4,
A number of state courts have considered either the Lassiter situation or
similar proceedings, such as child neglect hearings. These courts generally
find that counsel is constitutionally mandated.42 In State ex rel. Heller v.
Miller,43 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an indigent parent
has the constitutional right to counsel in an appeal of a termination proceed-
ing. The Heller court based its holding on "the existence of a fundamental
interest in equal treatment in appeals from judgments affecting one's
liberty." 44 The parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty interest that
merits equal treatment in appeals.45
Itl. EXTENDING THE LASSITER ANALYSIS
A. The Presumption
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Lassiter decision is the Court's
announcement that it would apply a presumption that states need furnish
counsel to an indigent litigant only in proceedings endangering physical
liberty.46 The Court distilled the presumption against counsel from its earlier
right to counsel cases and incorporated it into the Eldridge analysis. Although
the inclusion of a presumption might have radically changed the Eldridge
analysis, the only effect of the Court's application of the presumption was a
shift in the Eldridge balance: circumstances must weigh more heavily in favor
39. Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973) (removal from parental
custody); Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979) (adoption without parental
consent); Reist v. Bay Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976) (termination of parental rights); State
v. Caha, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973) (termination of parental rights); Crist v. Division of Youth and
Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (dependency), modified, 135 N.J.
Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972) (neglect); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6,399 N.E.2d 66(1980) (termination
of parental rights); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978) (termination of parental rights); In re Adoption of
R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973) (termination of parental rights); In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252, 533 P.2d
841 (1975) (dependency and neglect); State ex rel. LeMaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W.Va. 1974) (neglect).
See also Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (dependency); Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.
1974) (dependency, counsel to be provided on case-by-case basis); Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977) (dependency and neglect). These cases generally hold that denial of counsel violates the due process
clauses of both state and federal constitutions.
43. 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980).
44. Id. at 12, 399 N.E.2d at 69. The litigant's right to treatment in an appellate review equal to that in a trial
court was derived from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
45. 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 13,399 N.E.2d 66,70 (1980). The court cited Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as establishing the fundamental and nature of the interest.
46. 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
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of the litigant requesting counsel than would be necessary if another procedural
safequard were at issue.47
Examination of prior Supreme Court right to counsel decisions is useful
in understanding the genesis of the presumption against counsel. In the land-
mark case of Gideon v. Wainwright" the Court held that a felony defendant
had the constitutional right to appointed counsel. The Gideon Court based an
absolute right to counsel for felony defendants on sixth amendment and fifth
amendment due process standards. The Court emphasized the Anglo-
American tradition of fair trials and the unfairness of trying an uncounseled
defendant.49
In two subsequent decisions the Court extended the Gideon right to
counsel: in Argersinger v. Hamlin5" the Court extended the right to mis-
demeanor defendants facing incarceration and in In re Gault5' the right was
extended to minors in "civil" delinquency hearings. Thus, the right to coun-
sel clearly is not dependent upon a state characterization of a proceeding as
"criminal." In Argersinger the Court held that even brief incarceration is a
sufficient deprivation of liberty to require provision of counsel.52 The Gault
Court observed that the minor faced institutionalization until age twenty-one
53
and held that counsel was necessary to protect against an unjust deprivation of
the minor's physical liberty. 4
In both cases discussed above the threat of imprisonment or its equi-
valent was an important factor that influenced the Court's extension of a right
to counsel. Scott v. Illinois,55 a criminal case in which the Court refused to
require counsel for a defendant who had not been sentenced to prison,
brought the centrality of the interest in physical liberty into clear focus. 56 The
Court called deprivation of physical liberty "different in kind" from other
punishments such as "fines or the mere threat of imprisonment. 57 This view
clearly underlies the Lassiter presumption.
In his dissent in Lassiter Justice Blackmun agreed that the Eldridge test
was applicable to parental termination cases but argued vigorously against the
use of the presumption established by the majority.5 8 He asserted that the
47. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court applied only the Eldridge test to a
request for a noncounsel procedural safeguard (blood typing in a paternity suit). Little indicates that the Lassiter
presumption is inapplicable to cases in which the right to counsel is not at issue.
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. Id. at 342-45. See also infra note 128.
50. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. The Argersinger Court phrased the rule as follows: "(N]o imprisonment may be imposed, even though
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel." 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). Thus, an accused
misdemeanant may be tried and convicted without counsel, but may not be sentenced to any time in prison
unless representation is furnished.
53. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
54. Id.; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (right to counsel in parole revocation hearing).
55. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
56. The Court limited its holding in Scott to cases in which the defendant actually is sentenced to prison,
rather than those in which a prison sentence is merely a possibility.
57. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). The Lassiter Court quoted this language at 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
58. 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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presumption was not warranted by precedent and noted that previous deci-
sions addressing the right to counsel had turned on the importance of the
individual interest and the extent to which the state had sought to curtail that
interest.5 9 Justice Blackmun argued further that the presumption destroyed
the flexibility of due process, which should emphasize "attentiveness to the
particular context." 6 He also castigated the majority for adopting a case-by-
case approach, urging that due process analysis should center on "considera-
tion of different decisionmaking contexts, not of different litigants within a
given context."-6' Blackmun concluded that under the Eldridge analysis,
without the presumption, parental termination cases warrant provision of
counsel.62
Under the majority approach presence of counsel is typically a constitu-
tional requirement in proceedings that may result in deprivation of physical
liberty.63 Loss of physical liberty may result indirectly from a divorce decree.
For example, a conviction for contempt of court for failure to pay child
support64 or postdivorce charges, such as bigamy, 65 can lead to incarceration.
Even though the indigent defendant would be provided counsel in the criminal
prosecution, the divorce court's adverse findings on crucial issues would be
damaging to the defendant's case. Nonetheless, because divorce litigation
only indirectly threatens the parties with imprisonment, indigents asserting
the right to counsel must overcome the Lassiter presumption. A petitioner
must present facts sufficient to rebut the presumption on two levels. He or she
must argue that divorce litigants in general have an absolute right to counsel
and that under the Lassiter case-by-case approach petitioner's own case also
requires counsel.
B. The Balancing Factors
The Lassiter Court held that the tripartite Eldridge balancing test 66 could
be used to rebut the presumption against counsel. Although the Court would
presume in a divorce context that counsel for an indigent divorce litigant need
not be furnished to comply with due process, the litigant could overcome this
obstacle by demonstrating that the balancing elements weigh in favor of pro-
viding counsel. The Lassiter analysis requires this balancing to be performed
at two levels: a court first should consider divorce litigants as a class and then
it should review the petitioner's particular case. The following sections of this
Case Comment will examine each of the three branches of the balancing test
as applied to the divorce litigant.
59. Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
64. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:4-30.15(c) (West 1952); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.21 (Page 1982);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-210 (1975).
65. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 283 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-2 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.01 (Page 1982).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
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1. The Individual Interest
Under the Lassiter analysis the key to finding a right to counsel in a
particular proceeding is the importance of the individual interest at stake. A
relatively trivial interest will not outweigh the state's interest in limiting public
expenditures for the provision of counsel. 67 The more important the individ-
ual interest, the more probable that the balance will tip in favor of the indigent
litigant. The Lassiter Court recognized that a parent-child relationship is a
fundamental individual interest~s deserving of constitutional protection.
69
Success in obtaining reversal of a divorce decree entered without representa-
tion of counsel will turn in large measure upon the litigant's ability to convince
a reviewing court that the marital relationship is as fundamental as the individ-
ual interest in Lassiter.
On several occasions the Supreme Court has accorded constitutional
significance to matrimonial interests. As early as 1923 the court recognized
that the liberty interests protected by due process included "the right of the
individual . . . to marry . ,70 Later in Skinner v. Oklahoma7' the Court
invalidated a statute authorizing sterilization of twice-convicted felons. The
Court gave the legislation more exacting scrutiny because it touched upon
"one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race."-
72
In Grisvold v. Connecticut73 the Court, by emphasizing matrimonial
interests, recognized that a right of privacy exists in intimate associations. At
issue in Griswold was a law banning the use of contraceptives by anyone,
including married persons. The Court overturned the statute, explaining that
the marital bedroom is within a zone of privacy that emanates from several
constitutional guarantees. 74 Two years later in Loving v. Virginia75 the Court
struck down an antimiscegenation statute on equal protection and due process
grounds. The Loving opinion uses strong language to emphasize that the
fundamental nature of matrimonial interests commands heightened constitu-
tional protection. 76
67. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
68. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
69. Numerous cases considered by the Court have contained various parent-child issues. See, e.g., Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (removal of children from foster home); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance preventing certain family members from living together);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (removal of children from custody of unwed father); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child prevented from distributing magazines in furtherance of family religion);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (mandatory public education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (prohibition of foreign language instruction to young children).
70. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
71. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
72. Id. at 541.
73. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. Id. at 485.
75. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. The Court stated that "[tihe freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. at 12.
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While the decisions noted above establish the constitutional importance
of facilitating the marriage relationship, they do not speak to an individual's
interest in terminating his marriage. Boddie v. Connecticut77 presented the
Court with an opportunity to consider a litigant's right of access to the courts
in a divorce proceeding. The plaintiffs in Boddie were indigent divorce lit-
igants who were denied court access because they could not afford filing
fees.78 The litigants claimed that this denial of access violated their constitu-
tional rights. Noting the constitutionally protected nature of the marriage
relationship,79 the Court concluded that individuals seeking to terminate a
marriage by the only permissible method8" must be given a "meaningful op-
portunity to be heard." 8' The majority opinion observed that the bar imposed
by the filing fees impinged on the fundamental interest in marriage in two
ways: (1) it forced the applicants to remain married and (2) it prevented them
from entering into another marriage.
82
A pair of post-Boddie holdings, United States v. Kras83 and Ortivein v.
Sch ivab,84 emphasized the importance of the fundamental interest in marriage
to the outcome in Boddie. Although both cases concerned court filing fees
similar to those in Boddie, the indigent parties sought to litigate matters other
than divorce. In Kras the petitioner was denied access to the bankruptcy
court;8 5 in Ortwein the petitioner desired judicial review of administrative
action terminating welfare benefits. 86 The Court held that Kras and Ortwein
did not represent violations of due process. 87 In both cases the Court distin-
guished Boddie, in part by arguing that the interests in bankruptcy and welfare
are not as fundamental as the interest in marriage and family life.!
The Boddie due process standard of "meaningful opportunity to be
heard" remains valid for requests for various procedural safeguards in cases
touching on fundamental interests.89 Arguably, both denial of access to the
court and denial of counsel to a divorce litigant preclude a meaningful oppor-
77. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
78. Id. at 372.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Divorce is a creature of statute and thus is within the control of the legislature. People ex rel. Doty v.
Connell, 9 I11. 2d 390, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956); Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685
(1927); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972). Thus, as the Supreme Court recognized
in Boddie, the state's statutory procedures are the only way in which one may terminate a marital relationship.
81. 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
82. Id. at 376.
83. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
84. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
85. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
86. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
87. 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973); 410 U.S. 656, 656 (1973).
88. 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973); 410 U.S. 656,659 (1973). The Court also distinguished Boddie on the issue of
state monopolization of dispute resolution. The state decreed the sole method of terminating marriage, but
theoretically the issues in Kras and Ortvein could be resolved without reference to a court. 409 U.S. 434, 445
(1973); 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973).
89. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981), decided the same day as Lassiter, in which the Court
quoted the Boddie standard.
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tunity to be heard. 90 Regarding both the right to counsel and other safeguards,
however, the Boddie holding apparently is a conclusion that can be reached
only by applying tests such as the Lassiter analysis. 9' Concerning the right to
counsel, the application of the Lassiter approach presumably 92 determines
whether counsel must be provided to assure a meaningful opportunity to be
heard both in a given class of cases and in a particular example of the class.
Because of its importance in the Lassiter analysis when fundamental rights
are at issue, the risk of erroneous determination when a divorce litigant is not
represented by counsel determines whether that litigant has been afforded the
due process as defined in Boddie.93
Whatever the present role of the meaningful opportunity to be heard
standard, Boddie is important to the divorce litigant for another reason. The
Boddie Court recognized that the right to terminate one's marriage is as
fundamental as the right to marry.94 Despite their apparent differences, both
matters affect important individual interests.
In Lassiter the Court examined both the importance of the individual
interest at issue in the proceeding and the effect of an adverse outcome on that
interest. 95 The consequences facing an unsuccessful party in a divorce pro-
ceeding differ depending on whether the litigant is the plaintiff or the defend-
ant. A plaintiff will be forced to remain married; conversely, a defendant
may be divorced against his or her will.
If the plaintiff is unable to obtain a divorce, the plaintiff's spouse might
continue to exhibit behavior constituting a fault ground for divorce.96
Examples of such behavior include extreme cruelty, gross neglect of duty,
and adultery. 97 Under less extreme circumstances, married persons who have
no desire to remain together will be forced to do so and thus will have to
endure all the attendant unpleasantness of that situation. Furthermore, as the
Supreme Court noted in Boddie,98 unless a person is legally divorced he or
she cannot remarry. 99
90. The New York Court of Appeals has held, however, that an indigent divorce litigant has no constitu-
tional right to counsel. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). The court read
Boddie to require only that the litigant be permitted entry into the judicial process. Boddie had considered this
precise issue. The Smiley court did not consider the principle of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and
rationalized its decision in part by asserting that the appropriation of money for appointed counsel is a legisla-
tive, not a judicial, function.
91. The Court in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), applied the Eldridge test to reach a result, then
referred to Boddie in conclusory fashion.
92. The Lassiter Court never mentioned Boddie. The Court did, however, apply the more complex
Eldridge-presumption approach to right to counsel cases, rather than the Boddie test.
93. See infra subpart InI(C).
94. 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971).
95. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
96. Note, Justice for the Poor? A Look at the Right to Counsel for Indigents in Divorce Litigation, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 100 (1976).
97. "The court of common pleas may grant divorces for the following causes: ... Adultery;... Extreme
cruelty; ... Any gross neglect of duty .... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page 1980). Many states still
have fault grounds for divorce. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1,
1981, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4049, 4051-53 (1981).
98. 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
99. Failure to observe the proscription of remarriage may result in punishment. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.01 (Page 1982) (bigamy a first degree misdemeanor).
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The effects of an unfavorable holding on the divorce defendant are equal-
ly serious. A defendant who wishes to try to keep the marriage intact will be
denied that opportunity. " A parent could unfairly lose custody of a child,
thus raising yet another constitutional concern.' 0' An unwanted divorce might
impose additional debts upon the indigent defendant through alimony or child
support. In addition, a court may unjustly find a defendant guilty under a fault
ground, resulting not only in embarassment but quite possibly in criminal
liability. 102 The divorce defendant also deserves special consideration because
he or she does not initiate the proceedings.'0 3
For both the plaintiff and the defendant, an adverse outcome also affects
a fundamental individual interest separate from the interest in marriage. The
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird04 recognized that the right of privacy includes
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 05 Because the denial of a
divorce to a divorce litigant may inhibit his or her decision to bear a child with
another partner, the outcome of divorce litigation clearly may have a sub-
stantial impact on this important individual interest.
The Lassiter Court accorded great weight to the fundamental interest of a
parent in his or her child.' 6 The individual's interest in marriage deserves
similar consideration in divorce litigation; the matrimonial interest should
become a consideration in the Eldridge balancing process. The Lassiter Court
further acknowledged that parental termination hearings have a grave effect
on the individual interest at stake.' 07 The fundamental interest in marriage
may be affected similarly by divorce litigation. In Lassiter the Court held that,
given the importance of the individual interest at stake, some parental ter-
mination defendants would be denied due process if they were denied coun-
sel. Similarly, the significance of and the effect upon the individual interest in
the divorce proceeding tips the Eldridge balance in favor of at least some
divorce litigants.
2. The State's Interest
The state's fiscal interest in the proceeding is an element in the Eldridge
balancing test generally weighing against the person requesting counsel. The
state has a substantial interest in supervising the expenditure of public funds
100. See Note, Indigents' Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation: Heller High Water in Ohio, 12 U. TOL. L.
REV. 131, 146-47 (1980).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
102. See supra statutes cited at note 65, which criminalize bigamy. See also e.g., statutes penalizing
fornication, IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.335 (1968); and adultery, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (1974).
103. See generally Botein, Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A Constitutional Right
Without a Judicial Remedy?, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 368 (1970).
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
107. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
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and in limiting the use of tax revenues to projects approved by the state
legislature. Because of the expense of providing counsel to indigent divorce
litigants, the state's fiscal interest favors witholding counsel. Nonetheless,
some state interests support the litigant's right to counsel. All states have
enacted grounds for granting and procedures for obtaining divorce. States
therefore are interested in an accurate determination to uphold the integrity of
their divorce mechanisms. Counsel may be necessary to ensure such a deter-
mination, thus a state may favor provision of counsel.
Divorce on a proper showing of fault is a procedure entrenched in
American law. Most states also have enacted "no-fault" divorce legislation. 's
These statutes evidence a public policy favoring legal termination of mar-
riages that functionally are dead by granting divorce on the agreement of the
parties or on such grounds as "irretrievable breakdown."'09 Because no
state denies divorce,"° each jurisdiction's statutory grounds of divorce con-
stitute legislative condemnation of those situations within the marital relation-
ship that are against public policy. "' That policy is frustrated to the extent
that a person is trapped (because of a lack of sufficient funds to hire counsel)
in circumstances that would constitute a ground for divorce. The state, there-
fore, shares the individual's interest in a correct determination, an interest
that is furthered by participation of counsel."
2
As a primary justification for their refusal to provide counsel to indigent
litigants, states often point to the excessive administrative cost required. "
3
Recent federal and state budgetary difficulties substantiate this concern.
Methods other than state-funded counsel exist, but mechanisms such as Legal
Aid and uncompensated representation by local attorneys are insufficient to
render assistance to everyone who needs a divorce attorney. "4 Although
recognizing the state's fiscal interest, the Lassiter Court found that, at least
when the risk of erroneous determination was high, protection of the funda-
108. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 FAMI. L. REP.
(BNA) 4049, 4051 (1981).
109. A common form of no fault legislation is "a general category of laws which require... proof of
'irretrievable breakdown,' 'irreconcilable differences,' or some similarly phrased condition which presumably
denotes that the marriage is dead." W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 390 (3d ed. 1978).
110. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as ofAugust 1, 1981, 7 FAI. L. REP.
(BNA) 4049, 4051-52 (1982).
111. See, e.g., Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946); Hamm v. Hamm, 30 Tenn. App. 122, 204
S.W.2d 113 (1947).
112. The presence of counsel could be counterproductive, however, in a hearing intended to be informal
and nonadversarial. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 47 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
113. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981); Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 603
(5th Cir. 1981); Reist v. Bay Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326,351-52, 241 N.W.2d 55,66 (1976); Crist v. Division of
Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402,416-17,320 A.2d 203,211 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), modified,
135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Note, Indigents' Right to Counsel in Civil
Litigation: Heller High Water in Ohio, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 131, 146-47 (1980); Note, The Indigent's Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 551-52 (1967).
114. Comment, Right to Assigned Counsel in Divorce Actions and the Effects of Matter of Smiley: Setting
the Boundaries in a New Frontier, 40 ALB. L. REV. 513, 535-37 (1976); Comment, The Right to Counsel in Civil
Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1323-25 (1966).
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mental parent-child relationship justified an increase in the state's fiscal out-
lay. "15 Before it applied the presumption against counsel, the Court down-
played the state's cost interest, terming it "hardly significant." 116 The state's
cost interest is more weighty in divorce actions than parental termination
hearings because divorce cases arise in greater numbers, making provision of
counsel more costly to the state. 117
A state that declines to provide counsel also might assert its interest in
the relative allocation of legal resources to support its position." 8 Although
many persons need legal services, only a limited pool of attorneys exist, and
fairness to all litigants demands that court dockets be kept to a reasonable
length. Moreover, not every dispute is so important to the persons concerned
that reference to legal machinery is necessary. The high cost of legal represen-
tation encourages the parties to resolve their minor disputes without going to
court.
When added to the Eldridge balancing test, the Lassiter presumption
requires the petitioner to make a stronger showing of his or her need for
representation to justify provision of counsel. In effect, this increased burden
gives greater weight to the state's economic interest. As a result, the Lassiter
Court held that in parental termination hearings as a class the fundamental
individual interest is insufficient to overcome both the state's fiscal interest
and interest in informal proceedings. "9 The Court went on to say, however,
that an individual interest might be strong enough in some cases to outweigh
the state's interest; thus a case-by-case determination of the necessity of
counsel must be made.120 In Lassiter the effect of the presumption against
counsel precluded an absolute right to counsel despite the presence of a
fundamental individual interest. The risk of erroneous determination, because
it differs widely among parental termination cases, distinguishes particular
cases requiring counsel from those that do not. '
2
'
If the Court extended the Lassiter rationale to divorce proceedings, it
clearly would not declare an absolute right to counsel in divorce litigation.
Although an important individual interest deserving protection is at stake,
Lassiter also concerned a similar interest, and there the Court found that no
absolute right to counsel existed. Moreover, because the state's cost interest
is greater in divorce cases than in parental termination hearings, a decision in
favor of all indigent divorce litigants is unlikely. Despite the greater cost of
115. 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). But see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
116. 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
117. There were 1,181,000 divorces granted in the United States in 1979. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2589
(1981). It is unclear how many divorce litigants would warrant appointed counsel, but such litigants are surely
more numerous than those parental termination defendants who would be entitled to representation under
Lassiter.
118. See McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509, 511
(1975-76).
119. 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
121. 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981).
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counsel in divorce litigation, presence of counsel assists in the protection of a
fundamental interest. Consequently, a case-by-case approach like that ap-
plied in Lassiter also would be appropriate in the divorce situation. Again, the
determination of the risk of erroneous outcome is the key element in a court's
attempt to apply the Eldridge analysis to draw a distinction among various
divorce cases. 122 This Case Comment now will examine that element.
3. The Risk of Erroneous Determination
The third prong of the Lassiter test requires the court to measure the risk
of erroneous determination in the hearing. The following two factors contrib-
ute to the possibility of error: First, the general difficulties that a lay person
faces in a court of law; and second, the particular difficulties that a litigant
encounters in divorce litigation. In addition, a particular case might present
circumstances making self-representation unusually problematical. This last
issue is crucial in determining which divorce cases merit the appointment of
counsel.
To obtain a divorce, a person must follow a formal court procedure.
Divorce cannot be obtained by mutual consent alone or by an extra-judicial
process.'23 Therefore, a lay person seeking divorce faces problems common
to any litigant who resorts to using the judicial system. A litigant in a civil case
must prepare pleadings, recognize and investigate relevant evidence, present
this evidence in an admissible way, make an argument based on correct legal
theory, and avoid procedural pitfalls, such as failure to file motions within the
requisite time periods. i24 Competent legal advice will reduce the risk of erro-
neous result.
The obstacles confronted by a pro se litigant in civil litigation are pro-
ducts of the adversary system of dispute resolution.2' The particular fact
finder functions not as a mediator attempting to reach an understanding be-
tween the parties, but as an arbitrator deciding which party has presented the
superior case. The trier of fact has no independent responsibility to inves-
tigate the allegations and so must rely on competent evidence adduced by the
parties. Use of the adversary system increases the importance of judicial
precedent and legal rules and standards derived from other sources. American
judicial process frowns on ad hoc decision-making, but precedent and legal
doctrines generate great confusion for uncounseled litigants. This confusion
increases the risk of erroneous determinations.
The Supreme Court has been cognizant of these concerns. In Powell v.
Alabama 126 the Court held that a criminal defendant facing capital punish-
122. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
123. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
124. Comment, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1331 (1966); Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1967).
125. Comment, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1331-32 (1966).
126. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ment has the right to counsel. The Court's opinion in Powell contains an
eloquent statement of the vital role of legal representation in a judicial pro-
ceeding.'27 The Court reaffirmed its sympathy to this concern in Gideon v.
Wainwright 128 by further holding that an indigent litigant in a criminal trial has
a fundamental right to assistance of counsel. The Court also has noted the
inequity of pitting an uncounseled litigant against a trained legal profes-
sional. 1
29
Of course, these cases concerned at least the possible loss of physical
liberty, while divorce ligitation does not. The Court held that, because of the
potentially grievous consequences under such circumstances, counsel was
necessary to reduce the risk of erroneous determination. As the Lassiter
presumption demonstrates, 30 however, the Court probably would consider as
less serious the consequences of an inaccurate outcome in a divorce case. The
risk of an erroneous determination, as distinguished from the result, is similar
any time a civil or criminal litigant proceeds pro se. The problems discussed
by the Court in Powell and Gideon are inherent in all judicial proceedings and
remain relevant even when the physical liberty of the litigant is not in jeop-
ardy.
The foregoing concerns are common to all civil and criminal litigation;
however some cases illustrate more clearly the need for counsel than others.
The particular problems presented by matrimonial litigation must be ex-
amined to determine if the absence of counsel increases the risk of an er-
roneous decision in a divorce action. Ohio's statutory scheme is typical of
divorce procedures: 3' it provides for divorce on no-fault (dissolution) 32 and
fault 33 grounds and for annulment.'34
A no-fault divorce presents the least difficulty for a pro se litigant. 135 The
127. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true it is of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 68-69.
128. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). "[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344.
129. Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964).
130. See supra subpart In1(A).
131. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States:An Overview as ofAugust 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 4049, 4051-53 (1981).
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.61 (Page 1980).
133. Id. § 3105.01.
134. Id. § 3105.31.
135. See generally McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counselfor Divorce Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509,
517-20 (1975-76).
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Ohio dissolution procedure'36 requires that both spouses file a petition in the
court of common pleas. 137 The petition must be accompanied by a separation
agreement, signed by both parties, containing provisions for property divi-
sion, alimony, custody, child support, and visitation. 38 The spouses then
must make a personal appearance before the court, which reviews the separa-
tion agreement. 139 If the court finds the agreement acceptable, it will grant the
dissolution. 40
Of course, this simplified method is available only if both parties agree to
a separation and its terms.14' Even if the spouses agree to separate, counsel
may be necessary to explain the implications and equities of the separation
agreement. 142 Another Ohio statutory no-fault provision 143 allows divorce if
the spouses have "without interruption for one year, lived separate and apart
without cohabitation." Whether a divorce will be granted under this statute
turns on factual questions that require proper pleading and proof.
Statutes in other jurisdictions authorize divorce on additional no-fault
grounds, such as incompatibility,'" irreconcilable differences or irremediable
breakdown, '45 and insanity.46 Certain facts must be presented to prove exis-
tence of these grounds. A party can ascertain the facts needed to sustain a
no-fault finding only by examining the law of the jurisdiction, a task best suited
to a lawyer.
To obtain a divorce on fault grounds in Ohio, the plaintiff must prove one
of the circumstances delineated in Ohio Revised Code section 3105.01. '47 The
statute permits divorce for bigamy, willful absence of the adverse party for
one year, adultery, impotence, extreme cruelty, fraud, gross neglect of duty,
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.61-.65 (Page 1980).
137. Id. § 3105.63.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 3105.64:
Not less than thirty nor more than ninety days after the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage,
both spouses shall appear before the court and each spouse shall acknowledge under oath that he has
voluntarily entered into the separation agreement appended to the petition, that he is satisfied with its
terms, and that he seeks dissolution of the marriage.
140. Id. § 3105.65:
(A) If at the time of the hearing either spouse is not satisfied with the separation agreement, ordoes not
wish a dissolution of the marriage, the court shall dismiss the petition and refuse to validate the
proposed separation agreement.
(B) If, upon review of the testimony of both spouses, and of the report of the investigator pursuant to
the Civil Rules, the Court approves the separation agreement and any amendments thereto agreed
upon by the parties, it shall grant a decree of dissolution of marriage incorporating the separation
agreement.
141. Id. § 3105.65(A).
142. Going through a divorce causes a great deal of emotional stress, creating still more difficulty for
rational decision-making for both parties. See McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce
Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509, 520 (1975-76).
143. 1982 Ohio Legis. Bull. 468 (Anderson).
144. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601(8) (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(A) (1978); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
145. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.052(l)(a) (Supp. 1982); KY. REV. STAT. § 403.025 (Supp. 1980); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1982).
146. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40(c)(10) (Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page 1980).
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habitual drunkenness, imprisonment of the adverse party, and procurement of
out-of-state divorce. Each ground raises factual questions, some of which are
relatively straightforward. Nonetheless, competent evidence is required to
prove any of the grounds. Furthermore, the terms "extreme cruelty" and
"gross neglect of duty," for instance, are vague, and their meaning is clarified
only by common law. In these circumstances a meritorious divorce action
may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to frame the complaint properly.'4
Various defenses to similar fault grounds for divorce exist in all jurisdictions.
For example, the defendant may plead collusion, 49 procurement,5 ° in-
sanity, 5' or recrimination and condonation.' 52 These defenses raise the pos-
sibility that uncounseled plaintiffs will prejudice their cases by introducing
facts proving a defense and that similarly positioned defendants will be unable
to prove an available defense.' 53
Marriages also may be terminated in Ohio by annulment. Ohio Revised
Code section 3105.31 154 requires proof of specific grounds. Factual issues
raised by claims of bigamy and nonage increase the need for counsel in an
adversarial context. 55 Defenses to annulment, 156 because of their complexity,
can act both as traps for unwary plaintiffs and missed opportunities for de-
fendants.
Issues other than the legal standards for termination of a marriage arise in
divorce litigation. Property settlements and alimony awards divide the
spouses' present and future economic resources. In many cases counsel is
necessary to protect the interests of a party during the determination and
distribution of alimony and property. If the litigants have minor children,
provision for child support presents an additional resource allocation
problem. Judicial decision-making regarding child support affects the econom-
ic interests of both the litigants and their children.
The presence of minor children also raises the question of which parent
will be given custody. Effective argument under the prevailing "best interests
of the child" standard 57 may be impossible without representation by coun-
sel. The custody test is vague and highly subjective making the assistance of
148. McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509, 520-21
(1975-76).
149. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 408 (1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 207(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
150. See, e.g., Gutzwiller v. Gutzwiller, 8 N.J. Super. 254, 74 A.2d 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 207(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
151. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d 653 (1958).
152. See, e.g., Neff v. Neff, 13 Md. App. 128, 281 A.2d 556 (1971) (condonation); Chastain v. Chastain, 559
S.W.2d 993 (Tenn. 1977); Wimbrow v. Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 156 S.E.2d (1967) (recrimination); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.08(b) (Vernon 1975). Many states have abolished traditional defenses. See Freed &
Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4049, 4053-54
(1981). Ohio is one of these states. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3 105.10(C) (Page 1980).
153. McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counselfor Divorce Litigants, 14 J. FAM. L. 509,521 (1975-76).
154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.31 (Page 1980).
155. See Note, Justice for the Poor? A Look at the Right to Counsel for Indigents in Divorce Litigation, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 100-01 (1976).
156. See, e.g., the "Enoch Arden" presumption of death, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2121.01 (Page 1976).
157. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Page 1982).
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counsel necessary to present the appropriate facts. A lack of legal sophistica-
tion by a pro se party may jeopardize the fundamental parent-child relation-
ship. 158
The foregoing matters may contribute to the risk of erroneous determina-
tion in divorce cases. The complexities arise out of the nature of matrimonial
litigation. Each divorce case is different and will contain different combina-
tions of the procedural and substantive issues discussed above. When the trial
judge applies the Lassiter test to a particular case, he must ascertain which
issues are present and the likelihood that their existence will be too much for
an uncounseled litigant to handle.
In its assessment of the risk of erroneous determination in Lassiter, the
Supreme Court examined the facts of the case to determine whether trouble-
some substantive or procedural issues were present. After concluding that
none existed, the majority considered the characteristics of the particular
litigant, Ms. Lassiter. "9 Similarly, in the divorce context, the trial judge must
determine whether the indigent litigant possesses any characteristics that
would make him or her more or less able to go forward pro se.' Of prime
relevance to this inquiry are the litigant's education and articulateness.
Under the Lassiter balancing test the trial judge has great discretion in
deciding whether a particular case requires provision of counsel. Even though
the judge must consider the full panoply of facts presented in the case, he has
wide latitude regarding the weight that he gives each fact. The Lassiter Court
held that counsel was unnecessary to afford Ms. Lassiter due process because
the presence of a lawyer would not have made a "determinative differ-
ence" 160 to the outcome of her case. The evidence was so unfavorable to Ms.
Lassiter that she would have lost even if she had been provided counsel.
Therefore, the trial judge in a divorce action must decide whether the entire
factual ambiance of the case indicates that the indigent litigant simply could
not prevail or, conversely, could not be defeated, even if the litigant was
represented by counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
The clear import of the Lassiter rationale, when extended to the divorce
context, is that some divorce litigants have the constitutional right to counsel.
Fundamental rights are at stake in both divorce and parental termination
hearings. 16' Because of the similar interests concerned, the Lassiter holding
mandating the provision of counsel on a case-by-case basis in parental ter-
mination cases is directly applicable to divorce proceedings. Under the first
step of its analysis the Lassiter Court held that parental termination defend-
158. See supra cases cited in note 69. See also Note, Justice for the Poor? A Look at the Right to Counsel
for Indigents in Divorce Litigation, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 100 (1976).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 67-94.
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ants do not have an absolute right to counsel; therefore it is unlikely that all
divorce litigants would have this right. The individual interests are similar in
the two proceedings, but the state's interest in withholding counsel is greater in
the divorce situation. 162
If due process requires provision of counsel to some, but not all, divorce
litigants, the court will have to draw what often are subtle distinctions among
the various divorce cases. This line-drawing process is the second step of the
Lassiter analysis. The Lassiter Court indicated that the trial judge must apply
the Lassiter analysis to the particular facts of each case to decide whether
counsel is necessary.' 63 Similarly, the trial court should examine the partic-
ular legal issues and facts of an indigent divorce litigant's case. Under this
approach, if all evidence is relevant, the judge should rule in favor of provid-
ing counsel unless the presence of a lawyer for the indigent litigant clearly will
not affect the outcome of the case.
Peter E. Van Runkle
162. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
163. 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
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